US Nuclear Command Sequence

Caveat - Forward Thinking Statement - Caveat

Published By : Goodwin-RC : CEO +1News Central

MAR 3RD, 2024

Initiating A Nuclear Attack / Response From The United States Follows A Well Published Sequence Of Events - In Particular - With Caveats To Avoid Either Error Or Conspiracy; Namely :

The process for authorizing a U.S. nuclear strike is a meticulously controlled sequence. Let’s delve into the steps involved:

Presidential Decision: The President of the United States holds the sole authority to initiate a nuclear strike. If such a decision is made, the following steps ensue.
Consultation with Advisors: The president confers with advisors, including the four-star general in charge of the U.S. Strategic Command based in Omaha, Nebraska. This consultation ensures a thorough assessment of the situation.
Encoded Messages: Once the president reaches a conclusion, a series of codes and encrypted messages are set in motion. These messages traverse through the Pentagon to reach the land- or sea-based missile launch sites.
Control Officers: At the launch sites, control officers simultaneously turn their security keys to initiate the launch. This synchronized action ensures the rapid transition from standby to missile launch, taking approximately five minutes1.
U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: The United States possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal, estimated to be over 100 times that of North Korea. The U.S. arsenal comprises around 6,800 nuclear weapons, with approximately 1,800 actively deployed at land bases and submarines1.
Launch Sites: Missile launch sites are located in five states within the continental U.S.: Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Additionally, the Eighth Air Force operates nuclear-capable bomber wings from bases in Louisiana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Missouri, and Texas1.
North Korea’s Capability: North Korea, despite international pressure, has demonstrated the capability to reach more than half of the continental U.S. with a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile. Intelligence estimates suggest that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un possesses up to 60 nuclear weapons1.

Remember, this process is governed by strict protocols and is a grave responsibility entrusted to the highest office in the land.

Question : Is The Safeguard In Place In The US To Prevent A US-Based Conspiracy Group From Undertaking Command Of The Nuclear Attack Launch Sequence In Absence Of The Evidence Of The US Being Attacked By A Hostile Nuclear Attack By A Third Party Nation?

Answer : "According to the web search results, the president of the United States has the sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, for any reason and at any time1. This system has been in place essentially since the beginning of the Cold War. No one in the Defense Department, Congress, or the judicial branch can lawfully prevent the use of nuclear weapons once the president’s order is given2. Therefore, there is no safeguard in place to prevent a US-based conspiracy group from undertaking command of the nuclear attack launch sequence, unless they somehow manage to influence or impersonate the president. However, the president bases their decision on many factors and will consider the advice and recommendations of senior advisors, such as the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and CCDRs3. This may provide some degree of oversight and deterrence against a rogue launch order."

Addendum : Can A Duly Elected US President Subvert The Nuclear Launch Protocols?

Answer : "That is a very interesting and important question. The nuclear launch protocols are the procedures and safeguards that govern the use of nuclear weapons by the United States. They are designed to ensure that the president, as the commander in chief, has the sole authority to authorize a nuclear strike, but also that the order is lawful, authentic, and necessary.

However, some experts and lawmakers have raised concerns about the potential risks and flaws of the current system, especially in light of the increasing tensions and threats from nuclear-armed adversaries. They argue that the president could act impulsively, irrationally, or illegally, and that there are not enough checks and balances to prevent or stop a catastrophic mistake.

According to some sources1 2 3, some possible ways that a duly elected US president could subvert the nuclear launch protocols are:

By issuing a false or fabricated order that bypasses the normal channels of communication and verification, such as using a personal phone or a private network.
By exploiting the ambiguity or uncertainty in the legal definition of what constitutes a lawful order, such as claiming self-defense, preemption, or retaliation.
By coercing, intimidating, or replacing the secretary of defense or other key officials who are supposed to advise and concur with the president’s decision.
By ignoring or overriding the objections or warnings of the military commanders or the legal counsel who are responsible for executing the order.
By taking advantage of a crisis, emergency, or breakdown in the command and control system that creates confusion, chaos, or panic among the relevant actors.

These scenarios are hypothetical and speculative, but they illustrate the potential vulnerabilities and loopholes in the nuclear launch protocols that could be exploited by a rogue or reckless president. Therefore, some experts and lawmakers have proposed various reforms and alternatives to the current system, such as requiring congressional authorization, judicial review, or a two-person rule at the top level, to enhance the accountability, transparency, and legitimacy of the nuclear launch authority2 3"

Well - We Really Feel Much Safer Now, Understanding This - Right?